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The US Central Intelligence Agency has cancelled a contract with a security company formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide that allowed the company to load bombs on CIA drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan, The New York Times reported late Friday.
Citing intelligence officials, the newspaper said the contract gave Blackwater employees an operational role in one of the CIA’s most significant covert programs, which has killed dozens of militants with Predator and Reaper drones.
The contract with the company, now called Xe Services, was canceled this year by CIA Director Leon Panetta, the report said.
CIA spokesman George Little said Panetta had ordered that the agency’s employees take over the jobs from Xe employees at the remote drone bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the paper noted.
Panetta had also ordered a review of all contracts with the company, according to the report
‘At this time, Blackwater is not involved in any CIA operations other than in a security or support role.
The disclosure about the terminated contract comes a day after The Times reported that Blackwater employees had joined CIA operatives in secret operations against suspected militants in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Posted by worldissues Saturday, December 12, 2009 1 comments




At least 10 militants have been killed and 14 others arrested in Khyber Agency on Saturday.

Recovered cache of arms and ammunitions from Shalobar area of Bara Tehsil were also shown to the media. The weapons included Indian guns and explosives from China among others.

A large quantity of IEDS, anti-aircraft guns and jihadi literature were also recovered from the possession of militants and wwere shown to the media.

According to the FC officials, ten militants were killed while 87 others were arrested during the operation in Khyber Agency in the last 24 hours.

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Over the years, several readers state asked me why Pakistan must fright an criticize as of India. They insinuate to facilitate as we are less than no threat from our eastern neighbour, our armed forces may possibly realignment extra of its troops to the Afghan border anywhere extreme fighting is vacant on, and anywhere our embattled units may perhaps do with reinforcements.

For the solve to this question, we requisite to write into the secret recesses of the Pakistani security establishment’s psyche. The younger generations on together sides of the border noticeably have no absolute realization of the resentment and slaughter that attended partition.

I was three when we indoors in Karachi commencing New Delhi, and the story of how our work out was attacked on the way is segment of the species lore. I allow a nebulous recollection of Liaquat Ali Khan’s legendary native tongue in which he critical his fist in India’s direction in a show of defiance. He was assassinated shortly thereafter, in 1951.

For just a brief moment, step hooked on the shoes of a major army police man surveying the strategic scenario as of his GHQ in Rawalpindi, shortly taking into account the birth of Pakistan. He sees a large, hostile neighbour to the east. East Pakistan is separated as of West Pakistan by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Hordes of refugees are flooding crossways the border. countless of the services possessions to facilitate were to be transferred to Pakistan have been blocked by India.

Soon subsequently partition, hostilities begin in Kashmir, confirming the establishment’s the pits fears more or less Indian intentions. by no means care with the purpose of taking into consideration the original do violence to launched by tribesmen keen on Kashmir to relief their Muslim brethren, it was the Pakistan defense force to facilitate played a chief role. In the thinker of on the whole Pakistanis at the time, this was a legitimate promotion to be the cause of Muslim-majority Kashmir interested in the fold.

equal as a child, I remember inquiry constant hearsay as regards how India sought to ‘undo’ partition, and was waiting for the new state to collapse. Newspapers were a lot full of statements by leaders on together sides of the border hurling threats and accusations at each other.

Against this setting of panic about and paranoia, it is painless to see why the Pakistani leadership reached to the West to sustain security. India had by now traditional close relations together with the Soviet Union, and plates had not in good health commencing decades of chaos caused by war and civil strife.

each magnificence has collateral concerns, and needs wealth to speak to them. The undertaking of the leadership is to work out how utter to be had income preference be not speaking between the imperative of guarding state frontiers, and the wants of the population. In a democracy, these competing burden on the exchequer are mediated done parliament. But at what time the armed seizes check of the state, it can dictate the size of the cake it requirements for itself.

In Pakistan, where we now boast all the outer trappings of democracy, the militia has completed yes indeed with the purpose of chosen governments are too weak to challenge it either on the question of reserve allocation, or concluded primary security-related policies. The new army-inspired furore on the Kerry-Lugar Act is an indication of the grip the generals have on real power.

done the years, the military came to perceive to facilitate not together as of outer threats, it also had to guard not in favor of internal weakness. In the eyes of the military establishment, the supporting group of pupils and the free system were equally sources of instability, and in this way had to be held in reserve below exact check. What it disastrous to see (and at a standstill does not) is with the intention of its own repetitive interventions experience done more to weaken the fabric of the state than any added factor.

By appropriate the self-appointed guardian of ‘Pakistan’s ideological frontiers,’ the mass took on a third role, and one for which it needed the cooperation of the Islamic parties.

This suited the mullahs perfectly, as it acceptable them to move forward their reactionary agenda in a Muslim people where they were regularly thumped at the polls. This marriage of convenience was sacred during the Afghan war while jihadis on or after around the world flocked to fight the godless Soviet Union.

Generations of litter officers at the armed forces conservatory at Kakul have been educated with the purpose of India is the eternal enemy; and that civilians are a basic evil who have to be endured, but never trusted. A part of this teaching is the notion with the intention of one Muslim soldier is match to 10 Hindus.

These are the officers now manning the highest positions of the defence forces. They are furthermore the ones who have an effect on Pakistan’s foreign relations, especially with nations upsetting our security.

In the 1990s, when India ready quick economic strides, it became fair to even our martial establishment to facilitate Pakistan may well no longer compete in terms of predictable armed forces power. While we matched India’s nuclear programme at crippling expense, we may perhaps not save up and our traditional foe in terminology of planes, tanks and men.

higher than all, we had vanished the technological verge with the purpose of American missiles had given us. existence of sanctions triggered by our nuclear programme lie in the wake of the anti-Americanism so as to infects our police man corps, and throughout them, much of our media.

In tidy to refurbish the military balance, our establishment turned to the army of jihadis raised to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. what time the Kashmiri uprising began spontaneously following rigged elections in the too late 1980s, Pakistan reacted by elementary instruction Kashmiri choice fighters, and then infiltrating Pakistani terrorists belonging to various jihadi outfits. India responded by sending in some host divisions. This apt our generals fine, as they had joined down sticky to partially a million Indian soldiers by carriage in just a few thousand jihadis.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s fend for of the Taliban in this episode held out the contract of a biddable government in Kabul. These policies were curved on their head by 9/11, when all forms of terrorism began to be viewed as abhorrence by the intercontinental community. The Americans, in particular, put huge pressure on Musharraf to halt his use of Islamic holy warriors as proxies.

But old way of life die hard. India is still seen as the honestly foe. Above all, Pakistan’s generals are convinced that preferably fairly than later, the Americans pray be required to pull out out because of flagging broadcast support, a good deal as they did beginning Vietnam. In this scenario, they are reliable India would be asked to tread in to make sure that the Taliban do not send back to Kabul.

Should this happen, Pakistan would be enclosed by Indian forces, and this is the self-assurance state’s worst nightmare.

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The week spent on Capitol Hill by Administration officials explaining President Obama's Afghan surge has produced much predictable politicking. Republicans tried in vain to coax Gen. Stanley McChrystal into admitting their claim that Obama had denied him the resources he needs to win; and Democrats tried in vain to prod Kabul Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to reiterate his argument against a troop surge. Everyone stayed on message, but in explaining how the strategy might work, Generals McChrystal and David Petraeus made clear that U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is not likely to end any time soon, or to produce a "victory" in the sense that Americans have used the term since World War II.

By declaring an intention to begin drawing down U.S. troops in July 2011 as Afghan security forces begin to take charge, Obama's West Point speech was criticized for giving the Taliban reason to lie low and wait out the Americans. It also, some argued, did little to discourage U.S. allies from hedging their bets — Pakistan's continued coddling of the Afghan Taliban, and President Hamid Karzai's reliance on self-serving warlords.

But the congressional testimony of those who will implement Obama's strategy makes clear that July 2011 is only an aspirational deadline. The decisions on the timing and scale of any troop withdrawal will be entirely conditions-based, McChrystal made clear, and he won't hesitate to ask for more troops if he thinks the situation demands it. (He didn't think it would, he assured legislators.) Still, the idea that any significant drawdown will be possible in 18 months requires a leap of optimism, given the state-of-play on the ground.

Indeed, if the key to withdrawing U.S. troops is the readiness of Afghan forces to take over, President Karzai on Tuesday had some sobering news. With "maximum effort," he said in Kabul, his own army would "hopefully" be in a position to provide security for the country five years from now. And, he hastened to add, simple economics dictated that an Afghan army big enough to take over from the Americans would have to be paid for by Washington for another 15 to 20 years.
Discussing deadlines right now was pointless, Petraeus suggested on Wednesday. A year from now, he said, Washington will have a better idea of whether the strategy is working. In the interim, the CENTCOM chief warned, things will get worse before they get better, and nobody should expect rapid progress. "Success will require steadfast commitment and incur significant costs," McChrystal added. "The sober fact is that there are no silver bullets."

What "Winning" in Afghanistan Means

All the senior figures in the Administration, when asked, insist they're in Afghanistan to win. It was left to McChrystal to warn Congress not to expect 1945-style unconditional surrender by the Taliban. In fact, the Taliban may not even be defeated in the sense that Americans typically use the term — McChrystal himself preferred words such as "disrupt" or "degrade." The general clearly recognizes that the Taliban are part of the fabric of Afghan life, and are unlikely to be eliminated. Victory, he said at one point, "could be similar to politics, where you defeat the other party in an election but you don't wipe them out." At another point, he defined the goal of the mission as "to prevent [the Taliban] from doing what they want to do," i.e. sweeping back to power in Kabul.

Right now, as McChrystal has repeatedly made clear, the insurgents are actually winning. The urgency of sending reinforcements is to stop them from overrunning any population centers, to halt their momentum and ultimately to fight them to a standstill. That would give space for the development of Afghan governance and security forces, but it would also enhance prospects for some sort of political solution. Karzai has already reached out to the Taliban leadership through intermediaries in Saudi-brokered talks that have gone nowhere.

It's generally acknowledged by Western officials that the outcome in Afghanistan will require a political solution that integrates most of those currently fighting for the Taliban. Right now, however, the Taliban have no interest in seeking compromise because they believe they can regain control of Afghanistan on the battlefield. Only if they're fought to a standstill, goes the argument, and if Taliban commanders see more to gain and less to lose in some form of power sharing, might they be prepared to settle for less than restoring what they lost when the U.S. invaded in 2001.

Even getting to that point is an uncertain bet, and will involve much tough fighting. The Administration has always insisted that its goal is to prevent al-Qaeda from renewing its sanctuaries in Afghanistan, and it was notable that McChrystal emphasized the importance of capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden in defeating al-Qaeda. By setting up Bin Laden's elimination as a benchmark of success, McChrystal raises an intriguing possibility. The U.S. commander led the Special Operations unit that eliminated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. If the war in Afghanistan is going to end on terms that are not an entirely comfortable fit with the American public's definition of "victory," eliminating the leader of al-Qaeda could be used to make up the difference.

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