A few weeks ago, a well-known U.S. military expert gave a wise speech about the near impossibility of making a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy work in Afghanistan. He gave two examples. The first was digging a well: "How could you do anything wrong by digging a well to give people clean water?" Well, you could create new enemies by where you dug the well and who controlled it. You could lose a village by trying to help it. And then there was the matter of what he called COIN mathematics. If there are 10 Taliban and you kill two, how many do you have left? Eight, perhaps. Or there might be two, because six of the remaining eight decide it's just not worth fighting anymore. Or you might have 20 because the brothers and cousins of the two dead fighters decide to take vengeance. "When I am asked what approach we should take in Afghanistan," General Stanley McChrystal concluded, "I say humility."
Yes, this was the infamous McChrystal London speech that allegedly put the military at odds, publicly, with President Obama. Actually, the controversy was all about a comment McChrystal made during the question-and-answer session, when he said a switch from counterinsurgency to a counterterrorism strategy, in which American troops are withdrawn and the war against al-Qaeda is fought mostly with drones and special forces, would be "shortsighted." A week later, the President said essentially the same thing at a meeting of congressional leaders. And while it could be argued that McChrystal overstepped by dissing one possible course of action in the midst of a presidential strategy review, it could also be argued that the option dissed was not under consideration.
In fact, most of the hoo-hah about Obama's Afghanistan strategy review has been a matter of smoke and mirrors. In a recent issue of this magazine, for example, Leslie H. Gelb — a prominent "opponent" of the current strategy — came out against the military's all-in option in Afghanistan, favoring instead a plan that would add three brigades, about 15,000 additional troops, this year. But the military's all-in option, a request for 40,000 more troops, is just that: an option. It is the upper end of three options that McChrystal has offered the President, I'm told; the low option was 10,000 troops, and the middle one was 25,000. When Presidents are offered a menu like that, we know what they usually pick. I'd be willing to bet that the plan Gelb laid out is close to what the Administration will decide to do in the next few weeks — two brigades, or 10,000 troops, will probably be sent to secure Kandahar city and environs, and two other brigades will be sent to train and advise the Afghan security forces.
Yes, this was the infamous McChrystal London speech that allegedly put the military at odds, publicly, with President Obama. Actually, the controversy was all about a comment McChrystal made during the question-and-answer session, when he said a switch from counterinsurgency to a counterterrorism strategy, in which American troops are withdrawn and the war against al-Qaeda is fought mostly with drones and special forces, would be "shortsighted." A week later, the President said essentially the same thing at a meeting of congressional leaders. And while it could be argued that McChrystal overstepped by dissing one possible course of action in the midst of a presidential strategy review, it could also be argued that the option dissed was not under consideration.
In fact, most of the hoo-hah about Obama's Afghanistan strategy review has been a matter of smoke and mirrors. In a recent issue of this magazine, for example, Leslie H. Gelb — a prominent "opponent" of the current strategy — came out against the military's all-in option in Afghanistan, favoring instead a plan that would add three brigades, about 15,000 additional troops, this year. But the military's all-in option, a request for 40,000 more troops, is just that: an option. It is the upper end of three options that McChrystal has offered the President, I'm told; the low option was 10,000 troops, and the middle one was 25,000. When Presidents are offered a menu like that, we know what they usually pick. I'd be willing to bet that the plan Gelb laid out is close to what the Administration will decide to do in the next few weeks — two brigades, or 10,000 troops, will probably be sent to secure Kandahar city and environs, and two other brigades will be sent to train and advise the Afghan security forces.
There is an effort afoot by neoconservatives, led by Senator John McCain, to paint the President as flaccid on national security. McCain has been going around for the past few weeks telling all comers — heatedly, at times — that Obama's strategy review is essentially a waste of time, that the President has to, has to, go with the 40,000-troop option in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration, unnecessarily defensive, added fuel to the fire by having National Security Adviser Jim Jones and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates obliquely chastise McChrystal for public lobbying.
Obama has made some mistakes on Afghanistan, and so has the military, but having a six-month strategic review is not one of them. No doubt, the President should have spoken with McChrystal more than once over the summer. The military's mistake was going ahead with a flawed battle plan that did not secure Kandahar, the second largest Afghan city and the fulcrum of the insurgency. That mistake made the six-month strategy review necessary, as did two other factors: the disastrously corrupt Afghan presidential election and a vastly improved capability to gather intelligence on al-Qaeda, which has resulted in the killing of more than half of the 20 targeted al-Qaeda leaders. Several of the principals involved in Obama's strategy review have told me that their ultimate position on troop levels will depend on whether a plausible government, newly committed to reform, emerges when the Afghanistan election process is finally completed. Either way, the increased success against al-Qaeda could mitigate the need for a full counterinsurgency strategy. "That's the central question of the internal debate," a senior Defense official told me.
In the end, it is a shame that smoke and puffery have obscured McChrystal's excellent speech. Those who speak of winning or losing in Afghanistan are using a primordial vocabulary. But the essential humanity at the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy — the idea that we succeed if we work at helping people — makes it worth trying. As the man said, this is about humility. In the 21st century, real power may be all about figuring out the right place to dig a well.
0 comments